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REPLY ARGUMENT1
Google does not dispute that it copied Oracle’s work as wantonly
as our hypothetical Ann Droid copied Harry Potter. It does not dispute
that the work it copied was, in its realm, as creative as a novel:
Without a hint of dissent, Google parrots Oracle’s demonstration that
the copied work was “‘original,’ … ‘intuitive,’ ‘attractive,’ ‘appealing,’
‘intricate,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘user-friendly.’” GB 5 (OB citations omitted).
Nor does it dispute that its defenses are equivalent to Ann’s defenses,
“But I wrote most of the words from scratch,” and “I copied only the
portions necessary to tap into the Harry Potter fan base.” And it agrees
that Ann could never get away with those defenses. But Google should
get away with those same defenses, it insists, for one simple reason:
Oracle’s work—“[h]owever creative and useful”—is not a “work of
imaginative fiction like Harry Potter,” but a computer program that “is
fundamentally a functional, utilitarian work.” GB 1.
Google concedes that § 102 of the Copyright Act, which defines
copyrightability, codifies the traditional dichotomy between ideas and

For ease of reference: “OB” is Oracle’s Opening Brief, “GB” is
Google’s Brief, and amicus briefs will be cited as “___ Br.,” according to
name or abbreviation of the lead amicus.
1
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expression. But it avoids the consequence of that concession: an
original work—even one that has a function—is entitled to copyright
protection so long as the author had multiple possible ways to express
an idea. Instead, Google asserts that if a computer program—or any
other literary work—is functional, it loses protection no matter how
creative it is. Google never explains how any software can be protected
under its view, since all computer programs are “fundamentally a
functional, utilitarian work.” GB 1.
Google only emphasizes its lack of case support by filling its brief
with quotations from the writings of an academic who has, for decades,
argued for changes in the law on the ground that Congress never should
have granted copyright protection to software. Beyond that, Google’s
effort to portray its position as Ninth Circuit law revolves around a
single sentence plucked out of context from Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (1993). Google ignores the section of Sega
that held that creative software is protectable, relying instead on the
fair-use analysis which has nothing to do with copyrightability.
As eager as Google is to import fair-use principles into
copyrightability, it offers only the most cursory response to Oracle’s

2
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argument that the copying was unfair as a matter of law. Google copied
the most useful portions of Oracle’s work for commercial purposes and
derailed Oracle’s already-thriving business of licensing Java for mobile
devices. Google tries to portray this as fair by cobbling together
snippets of the trial record into a narrative that is itself a work of
“imaginative fiction,” a story the district court already rejected.
A24,654-56.
For example, Google repeatedly asserts that Oracle’s software
packages were “open and free for anyone to use.” GB 9-10, 16, 34. That
is nothing but a play on words. As this Court recognizes, that is not
what “open source” means. Open-source licenses “are used by …
software developers … who wish to create collaborative projects and to
dedicate certain works to the public,” while, at the same time,
“provid[ing] creators of copyrighted materials a means to protect and
control their copyrights.” Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1378
(2008) (emphasis added). Google does not dispute that every other
business that wanted to put Oracle’s Java packages to commercial
use—including businesses that wanted to use only the declaring code—
took licenses. OB 2, 15-16, 76-77.

3
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Equally fictitious is Google’s protestation that it was shocked to
learn of the “Java copyrights.” GB 17 & n.79. The feigned surprise
comes at the end of a paragraph acknowledging that Google was in
intense negotiations about “taking a license” to the very packages it
copied. GB 17. And nowhere does Google dispute that its head of
Android reported up the chain of command that the Java packages “are
copyrighted[,] [a]nd Sun gets to say who they license … to,” A1200; see
A2689; OB 18-20, or that Google considered “buy[ing] the rights to Java
from Sun (patents, copyrights, etc[.]),” A2191 (emphasis added). Google
has more copyright lawyers than an AIPLA conference. It did not need
a tutorial from Oracle to know that it was unlawful to plagiarize.
To take one final example, Google asserts that Sun welcomed
“Android with open arms.” GB 20. In support, Google cites a blog post.
Google does not suggest that its platoons of copyright lawyers mistook
the post for the elusive license it had tried for years to secure. In any
event, the post was written before Google first released Android’s code
to outside programmers. A2198, 5828-31, 6541. Until that release,
Oracle “presumed” that Google either (1) used “GPL [General Public
License] code” and would donate the code back to Oracle under the

4
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open-source terms of the GPL license, A22,198; OB 14 (describing GPL),
or (2) would take a commercial license, A2685, 2688-90, 5828-30.
Fairly portrayed, the undisputed record confirms that there was
nothing fair about Google’s copying.
I.

COPYRIGHT LAW PROTECTS ORACLE’S SOFTWARE
PACKAGES.
This case is about copyright protection for computer software—

here, the particular declaring code and organization Oracle used in
Java SE. We warned of the mischief from using the verbal chameleon
“API” to describe these packages of code. OB 9. Google and its amici
exploit the ambiguity for maximum advantage, accusing Oracle of
imperiling anything that might be called an API, including “interfaces,”
GB 52, “access protocols,” “interface specifications,” CCIA Br. 3, 12-13,
“network sockets,” “rules for how programs communicate within a
single computer,” “firmware,” and “hardware,” Computer Scientists Br.
6-7, 12-15, 23, 31; see Start-ups Br. 3, 10. This case is not about those
abstractions or devices. It is only about protection for intricate and
highly creative packages of software that Oracle authored.
As to the packages actually before this Court, Google concedes
away all that matters—at least under established copyright principles.
5
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§ I.A. Unable to prevail under settled principles, Google concocts a
veritable mash of copyright law, consisting of large helpings of fair-use
doctrine and infringement principles but only a trace of copyrightability
law. The concoction bears no relation to the law Congress adopted, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and just about every circuit,
including the Ninth Circuit and this Court.
Google’s position rests on several flawed premises. First, it rests
on a reading of § 102 that the Supreme Court rejects. § I.B. Second,
Google incorrectly asserts that the fair-use analyses of Sega and Sony
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000), dispose of the case. § I.C. Then Google makes merger and
interoperability arguments that have no bearing on the copyrightability
of the original work in question (Java packages). § I.D. Finally, Google
resorts to a meritless waiver argument, § I.E, and to policy arguments
that are best addressed to Congress, § I.F.
A.

Google Concedes Away The Entire Case, At Least
Under Established Copyright Principles, And Declines
To Rebut Half The Copyrightability Arguments.

Google concedes away—either explicitly or tacitly—everything
necessary to resolve this case under established copyright principles.

6
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To start, Google concedes that it literally copied “7,000 lines of declaring
code,” GB 63; accord GB 18, and does not dispute that “the structure,
sequence and organization of the 37 accused API packages in Android is
substantially the same as the structure, sequence and organization of
the corresponding 37 API packages in Java,” A985, 22,771-72 (cited by
OB 43).
These concessions collapse the challenge to the district court’s
ruling into a single question: Is there any protected expression at all in
either the copied code or the copied structure? See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Google does not dispute
that copyright protection extends to computer programs—both to the
literal elements and to structure and organization. See GB 2, 37, 42-44;
OB 4, 31-32, 41, 44-45. Google then makes a key—indeed, a
dispositive—concession: that the declaring code and the structure and
organization of the packages are original under § 102. GB 5, 29-30.
Google also does not challenge—and even concedes—the district court’s
finding that the declaring code could have been written in any number
of ways “and still have worked,” A132; accord A133, 140-41, and that
the packages could have been organized in “many ways … [and] still

7
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duplicate[d] the same range of functionality,” A133. See A24,670
(Google’s concession); see also OB 32-33, 49-52, 60-61. Indeed, Google
goes one step further: It acknowledges Oracle’s extensive showing that
the packages are “‘original,’ ‘creative,’ ‘intuitive,’ ‘attractive,’ ‘appealing,’
‘intricate,’ ‘efficient,’ and ‘user-friendly.’” GB 5 (OB cites omitted); see
OB 12-13, 30 (district court’s finding), 38-40, 40-43 (declaring code), 4348 (structure and organization); McNealy Br. 10-20. But Google does
not dispute a word of that showing.
As our opening brief demonstrated (at 40-66), these concessions
are dispositive under established copyright principles. Copyright
protects original expression. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. The protection
persists even if the original expression also performs a function or is
contained within a method of operation. Under the classic
idea/expression dichotomy that the Supreme Court famously articulated
in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), the only time expression is not
protectable is if the author’s expression is the only possible way to
achieve the result, in which case the idea and the expression merge and
protecting the expression is tantamount to protecting the idea. OB 3233, 48-49. But so long as there are multiple ways to express that

8

Case: 13-1021

Document: 134

Page: 20

Filed: 07/03/2013

function or perform that process or method, the work is protectable.
OB 49-53.
Our opening brief documented all these points at length and with
numerous citations to caselaw. Google does not suggest that Oracle
misquoted these authorities or otherwise misstated established
copyright law. Yet, beyond paying occasional lip service to some of
these principles, see, e.g., GB 47-53, Google ignores them along with the
cases—from this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and numerous others—that
articulate and apply them to computer programs.
Google’s silent treatment extends to more than just established
copyright principles. Google also makes the startling strategic decision
to ignore half of Oracle’s copyrightability argument and to abandon any
effort to defend the keystone of the district court’s copyrightability
decision. As explained, Oracle presses “two distinct bases” for finding
copyrightability: “(1) the expressive declaring code; and (2) the creative
arrangement of each package.” OB 40. Google largely ignores the first.
As if to lampoon its own stance, Google asserts that it “did not use” any
of Oracle’s “underlying computer code … —unless one counts the 7,000
lines of declaring code” that Google copied. GB 63 (internal quotation

9
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marks omitted). They count. Front and center in the opening brief was
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539
(1985), the dominant Supreme Court case on “admitted” plagiarism.
OB 40-41. Google does not even cite, much less discuss, this case.
Similarly, a centerpiece of the district court’s copyrightability
holding was that declaring code is unprotected as short phrases.
A143-44, 162, 164-65. Google leaves a lengthy attack on that holding
unrebutted. OB 53-57; see GB 68. Oracle demonstrated that the
regulation covering short phrases prohibits protection for a “work” that
consists of nothing but a naked phrase but does not remove protection
for an assemblage of 7000 lines of code. OB 53-55 (collecting cases).
Google does not disagree. Oracle demonstrated that much of the
declaring code reads more like run-on sentences than short phrases.
OB 56. No response. Quoting Google’s Java guru, Oracle demonstrated
that there can be—and is here—“creativity and artistry in a single
method declaration.” OB 56-57. Again, nothing from Google.
Google buries its excuse in the recesses of its brief (at 67): It
asserts that the district court wasted its time in analyzing these issues
after the verdict, because they were waived at trial. That is as absurd

10
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as it sounds and, for reasons explained below (at 39-42), demonstrably
false. For present purposes, suffice it to say that if Google is wrong
about waiver, this Court can reverse without reading another page of
this copyrightability argument (and jump straight to fair use).
B.

The Traditional Understanding Of § 102(b) Does Not
Strip Creative Computer Programs Of Copyright
Protection.

Google urges a copyright construct that flouts every established
copyright principle described above. The crux of Google’s argument is
that the protection § 102(a) grants with one hand, § 102(b) withdraws
with the other, because the copied expression, though original and
creative, is a “functional element.” GB 2.
Section 102 provides in relevant part:
(a) Copyright protection subsists … in original works of
authorship …. Works of authorship include … literary works
….
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery ….
17 U.S.C. § 102. The parties present two starkly different readings of
§ 102. Oracle’s reading is supported by the overwhelming weight of

11
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authority. In support of its alternative reading, Google cites mainly law
review articles.
Oracle’s reading of § 102. Section 102 codifies the traditional
idea/expression dichotomy described above and the merger doctrine that
flows from it. OB 59-63. At one point, Google agrees, conceding that
§ “102(b) codifies the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Baker v.
Selden.” GB 31; accord GB 33. This is undoubtedly correct. Explains
the Supreme Court: “‘Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the
scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to
restate[, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright,]
that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains
unchanged.’” Feist, 499 U.S. at 356 (bracketed text omitted in Feist)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5670, and S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 54 (1975) available at
1975 WL 370212). In other words, § “102(b) is intended … to make
clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program” while “the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not.” H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 57.
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Again, Google seems to agree: Quoting the same congressional
reports relied on by Feist above, Google argues that § “102(b) …
‘make[s] clear’ that ‘the writing expressing a programmer’s ideas’—that
is, the code—is ‘the copyrightable element in a computer program,’
while ‘the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not
within the scope of the copyright law.’” GB 30-31 (alterations omitted;
emphasis altered); accord OB 59-60. Exactly so. “[T]he writing
expressing a programmer’s ideas” is “the code”—here, the declaring
code—which is protectable.
Google never acknowledges the consequence of these concessions.
This Court’s decision in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,
975 F.2d 832 (1992) (discussed at length in our opening brief (at 41-42,
44-45, 49, 60)) is instructive. Atari involved the copyrightability of
Nintendo’s program to unlock its gaming console by transmitting a
unique message from the game to the console. Under Atari, the “idea”
of a particular method or class is whatever function it is designed to
perform (like sending a data signal, 975 F.2d at 840, or opening an
internet connection, OB 9-10). Oracle cannot copyright the idea of
programs that open an internet connection. But it can copyright the
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precise strings of code used to do so, at least so long as “other language
is available” to achieve the same function. National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report (“CONTU
Report”) at 20 (1979); accord Atari, 975 F.2d at 840 (no merger when
“alternative expressions are available”); see OB 32-34, 48-52, 59-62.
Critically, Google does not suggest that Oracle is trying to protect
the idea of any of its packages. Nor could it, in light of the district
court’s unchallenged finding that the declaring code could have been
written and organized in any number of ways and still achieved all the
same functions. Supra at 7-8 (citing A132-33, 140-41; OB 32-33, 49-52,
60-61). Accordingly, under the principles Google claims to embrace,
§ 102(b) does not strip the highly expressive and creative packages and
their declaring code of protection just because they also perform
functions. See also Oman (former Copyright Register) Br. 7.
Google’s reading of § 102. Despite its concessions, Google
recasts § 102 in a way that bears no resemblance to Baker’s
idea/expression distinction, traditional merger analysis, or any other
longstanding copyright norm. Google maintains that § 102 requires a
“two-stage copyrightability analysis.” GB 29. In step (a), you assess
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“[o]riginality and creativity.” GB 45. But no matter how original and
creative a work, Google maintains, step (b) lists a series of “exclusions”
that withdraw protection to “functional and factual aspects of an
otherwise copyrightable work.” GB 30. Thus, according to Google, the
packages would receive copyright protection under subsection (a)
because they are “original,” but subsection (b) would then extinguish
every trace of copyright protection because the code is also functional.
Under Google’s reading, unlike in established merger analysis, it
matters not that there were infinite ways in which Oracle could have
written and organized the declaring code to express the thousands of
functions performed by the packages. GB 45. All that matters to
Google is that the code performs a function.
If Google’s reading is right, then Congress played a trick on the
software industry. Congress defined “literary work” to encompass
computer programs, thereby granting protection to “original” software
at step (a). But it then withdrew protection from all software at
step (b), because computer code always performs a function. OB 61-62.
And to guarantee that no software would ever survive step (b), Congress
defined “computer program” in functional terms: as a “set of statements
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or instructions [that are] used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
Google does not try to suggest a limiting principle that would strip only
Oracle’s declaring code of protection but somehow leave other software
intact. The most Google (and its amici) can muster is the tepid
assurance that Oracle’s implementing code “may be copyrightable.”
GB 65 n.165; see Rackspace Br. 4. But since implementing code is also
“functional[],” GB 13 n.49, there is no distinction. Thus, in one fell
swoop, Google’s statutory construct wipes out the unanimous view of
the courts and Congress that software has copyright protection.
OB 31-32, 37, 41, 44-45 (collecting cases); see Oman Br. 7-8, 14-17.
Actually, if Google is right, the trick is on just about every author
of any literary work. Google insists that “the same rules of
copyrightability” apply to “all works.” GB 42. So, any original work
that is also “functional” or “utilitarian” loses copyright protection:
encyclopedias, textbooks, The Bluebook, instruction manuals, maps, car
value guides, dental and medical taxonomies, and any other work
(“[h]owever creative”) that is also “functional” or “utilitarian.” GB 1; see
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 978 (7th
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Cir. 1997). Moreover, the way § 102 is structured, what is true of a
“method of operation” must be true of “any idea, … concept, [or]
principle.” So by Google’s reading, every “original” work would get
protection at step (a), but would lose it in step (b) if it also expresses
“any idea.”
Google’s proposed hermetic division between subsections (a) and
(b) is wrong. Over 50 years ago, the Supreme Court observed: “We find
nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars
or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limitation into the
copyright law.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). The same is
evident from the CONTU Report, whose recommendations Congress
adopted “almost verbatim” and which is considered “the authoritative
guide to congressional intent.” Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519 n.5. Invoking
Baker, CONTU rejected Google’s position, specifically as to software:
“Nor has copyright been denied to works simply because of their
utilitarian aspects.… That the words of a program are used ultimately
in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their
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copyrightability.” CONTU Report at 21 (emphasis added); see BSA Br.
8-11 (discussing CONTU Report).
Google does not even try to reconcile its two-step analysis with the
authorities cited above and in the opening brief granting full copyright
protection to computer code even though it performs functions.
OB 41-45, 49, 60. If Google’s two-step approach were the law, this
Court in Atari would not have held the 10NES protectable because it
served the function of locking and “unlock[ing] the NES console.” 975
F.2d at 840. And Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.
would not have granted copyright protection to “operating system
program[s]” that performed functions, including “allow[ing] data to be
passed between different parts of a program,” “turn[ing] on the
[computer’s] circuits,” “translat[ing] instructions,” and “control[ing] the
reading and writing functions of the disks.” 714 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1983); see Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886
F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989).
Again and again, courts find computer programs copyrightable—
despite their “utilitarian” or “functional” purpose—because the
developers had “some discretion and opportunity for creativity … in the
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structure” of the program. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1176. Thus,
courts routinely read Baker’s idea/expression principles to find
programs protectable simply because their authors seek protection of
their own expression—their own way of implementing the function,
their own “expressi[ve]” “structure, sequence, and organization of the
[program],” id. at 1175-76—and not the function itself. Atari, 975 F.2d
at 839; accord Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 885 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (Ginsburg, J.) (“variety of ways to perform the same function
sustains the classification of such works as ‘expression’”); Mitel, Inc. v.
Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Section 102(b) does
not extinguish the protection accorded a particular expression of an idea
merely because that expression is embodied in a method of operation at
a higher level of abstraction”; thus, “an element … may be characterized
as a method of operation, … [and] nevertheless contain expression that
is eligible for copyright protection”); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (§ “102(b) does not answer the question
of whether [plaintiff’s] particular expression of that idea is
copyrightable”); see also Oman Br. 3, 14-15, 18.
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Only one case has ever so much as suggested “that expression that
is part of a ‘method of operation’ cannot be copyrighted.” Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). It is hard to believe that
Lotus actually meant to be quite that expansive, particularly in light of
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist. But if it did, the case cannot
overcome this Court’s opposite conclusion, interpreting Ninth Circuit
law, that “expression of [a] process or method” is protectable. Atari, 975
F.2d at 839.
The statement in Lotus quoted above elicited howls of protest
among commentators, the most vocal of whom is now Google’s Senior
Copyright Counsel, William Patry,2 who lambasted the case for the
shallowness of its logic (e.g., “not even bother[ing] to cite the definition
[of computer program]”); “[i]gnoring Congress’s judgment and the
objective standard of originality”; and making “all computer programs
… unprotectable methods of operation.” William F. Patry, Copyright
and Computer Programs: It’s All in the Definition, 14 Cardozo Arts &

Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_F._Patry (last accessed, July
2, 2013).
2
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Ent. L. J. 1, 5-8, 13, 59-63 (1996) (footnote omitted)); see Paul I.
Kravetz, “Idea/Expression Dichotomy” and “Method of Operation”:
Determining Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 8 DePaul
Bus. L. J. 75, 77, 97-101 (1995) (predicting that Lotus “will seriously
impact the software industry”).
While Google contends (at 3, 61) that the Ninth Circuit has
embraced Lotus, the truth is that, in the 18 years since Lotus, the Ninth
Circuit has cited Lotus only once—as subsequent history on a
procedural issue (delay in filing). In fact, as demonstrated below (at
24-25), the two Ninth Circuit cases that Google relies upon most—Sony
and Sega—tacitly reject Lotus by finding the software copyrighted. See
Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring) (discussing dueling
options to address copyright for software). When presented with the
opportunity, the Ninth Circuit will undoubtedly embrace this Court’s
reading of Ninth Circuit law and explicitly reject Lotus, like the Tenth
Circuit. Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1372; see OB 62-63.
But this Court need not join the chorus of Lotus detractors here.
It can simply distinguish Lotus. First, Google copied Oracle’s code
verbatim, but, as Google concedes (at 58, 63), the Lotus defendant did
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not, 49 F.3d at 810. Second, Lotus found that the rudimentary
commands that were copied (“copy,” “print,” etc.) were not creative. Id.
at 809, 817; accord id. at 821 (Boudin, J., concurring). By contrast, the
declaring code and the structure and organization here are
undisputedly creative and original. GB 5, 29-30. Third, while the
commands in Lotus were “essential to operating Lotus,” id. at 817, the
same is not true of the vast majority of what Google copied, infra at 32.
Perhaps the best evidence of how far Google’s reading of § 102
strays from the caselaw lies in how heavily Google relies on articles—
specifically, the writings of one author, Professor Pamela Samuelson (on
this topic, GB 30-33, and others, GB 40, 51). See also Law Professor Br.
7-8, 10. Google cribs so much from this one academic that she should
demand royalties. The professor “firmly believes” that Congress was
wrong to grant copyright protection to computer programs and should
have created “a new form of intellectual property law.” Pamela
Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke L.J.
663, 764 (1984). That is what Google is pressing as well: a new form of
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intellectual property law that, in the unanimous view of the Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and this Court, Congress has rejected.
C.

Sega’s and Sony’s Fair-Use Analysis And Other Cases
Considering Infringement Have No Bearing On
Whether Oracle’s Software Packages Are
Copyrightable.

Google’s § 102 argument, however flawed, at least addresses the
right issue: copyrightability. The same cannot be said of the rest of
Google’s argument, particularly its focus on fair-use and infringement
principles in Sega and Sony.
Sega and Sony on fair use. A keystone of Google’s argument is
that “Sega and Sony dispose of Oracle’s key [copyrightability]
arguments.” GB 40. Google cites those two cases—Sega in particular—
on virtually every page of its 27-page copyrightability discussion,
GB 28, 31, 33-34, 36-44, 46, 48-49, 52, and quotes one isolated sentence
in Sega six times, GB 3, 36, 38, 42-43, 50, 52. But those portions of the
opinions discuss fair use, not copyrightability, and Google ignores what
those cases teach about copyrightability.
Sega sold video games to run on its own consoles. A competitor
(Accolade) wanted to distribute its own games to run on Sega’s console.
So it made copies of the software in Sega’s games to learn how they
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worked and to figure out how to make the console play Accolade’s
games. 977 F.2d at 1514-15, 1523-27. In Sony, a competitor
(Connectix) wanted to create a program that could play PlayStation
games on computers (not just on PlayStation consoles). So Connectix
copied chunks of Sony’s code to learn how the console functioned. 203
F.3d at 593. In each case, the infringement allegation centered around
the copies these competitors made of the games’ software for research
and development purposes. And in each, the defendant asserted that
making those copies was fair use.
Before ever getting to fair use, Sega discussed at length the
threshold question whether software is copyrightable. Google omits
that analysis. Sega considered—and rejected—the “argument that
object code is not eligible for the full range of copyright protection.” 977
F.2d at 1519. Discussing § 102(a), Sega recognized that Congress
“unambiguously extended copyright protection to computer programs.”
Id. “The statutory language, read together with the CONTU report,
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the copyright in a computer
program extends to the object code version of the program.” Id. at 1520.
Accordingly, Sega held that the code Accolade “copied [was] protected
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expression.” Id. at 1524-25. In so concluding, Sega rejected “scholarly
authority” “that object code is not [protectable],” id. at 1519, including
some of the same commentators who now appear before this Court, see
Law Professors Amicus Br. (including Samuelson) in Sega v. Accolade,
republished at 33 Jurimetrics J. 147, 153-54 n.17 (1992-1993) (citing
Prof. Samuelson in advocating against protection for object code).
In Sony, the copied code was so clearly copyrightable that
Connectix did not contest the point. Still, the court never would have
addressed fair use if it believed the code was unprotectable, since fair
use applies only to “copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis
added).
Ignoring all this, Google fixates on the opinions’ fair-use analyses,
characterizing them as “controlling” on “copyrightability.” GB 29.
Google justifies the ploy on the ground that the “fair-use rulings were
predicated and dependent upon fully considered holdings that the
compatibility elements are not copyrightable under section 102(b).”
GB 39 (emphasis omitted). That is where Google’s favorite sentence
comes in: “[C]omputer programs … contain many logical, structural,
and visual display elements that are dictated by the function to be
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performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as
compatibility requirements and industry demands.” Sega, 977 F.2d at
1524 (emphasis added).
Nothing in this sentence in any way contradicts the point,
explained above (at 12-20), that functional works are protectable so long
as there are alternative ways to achieve that same function. Nor does it
change the law (explained at OB 52-53, 63-65, and addressed below, at
34-37) that, for the copyrightability analysis, external factors such as
compatibility requirements and industry standards are measured at the
time of creation of the original work (here, Java), and no such
considerations constrained the original Java developers.
In any event, nothing in that sentence, or the rest of Sega, can be
read as suggesting that an intricate array of 7000 lines of concededly
original and creative computer code, GB 5, 29-30, is completely devoid
of copyright protection—especially when Sega already found that the
software in question was entitled to copyright protection. 977 F.2d at
1519-20, 1525. Saying that certain “elements of computer programs are
not copyrightable,” GB 39 (emphasis added), is not the same as saying
that the entire work loses all copyright protection. As our opening brief
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explains (at 46), but Google never addresses, the Supreme Court has
held that even if a work “contains absolutely no protectable written
expression,” the original “selection or arrangement” of the unprotectable
elements is protected so long as it “entail[s] a minimal degree of
creativity,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, which is already conceded here, GB 5,
29-30.
The rest of Sega’s fair-use discussion confirms the point. Google’s
favorite sentence was the culmination of the court’s analysis of the
“second [fair use] factor, the nature of the copyrighted work.” 977 F.2d
at 1524. The discussion concerned “the extent of copyright protection,”
id. (emphasis added)—not whether the entire program was unworthy of
copyright protection. And Sega acknowledged that “the programmer’s
choice of program structure and design may be highly creative and
idiosyncratic,” id., as Oracle’s structures are, even though “computer
programs are, in essence, utilitarian articles—articles that accomplish
tasks.” Id.3

Sony adds nothing more. It reaches the same holding: “We
conclude that, under the facts of this case and our precedent,
[defendant’s] intermediate copying and use of [plaintiff’s] copyrighted
[work] was a fair use for the purpose of gaining access to the
unprotected elements of [plaintiff’s work].” 203 F.3d at 602.
3
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In the end, to read Sega’s and Sony’s fair-use analyses as Google
does—removing protection for a work just because it has functional
elements—would require this Court to conclude that those fair-use
cases silently rejected the Supreme Court’s teachings in Feist and
Mazer; the CONTU Report’s analysis of the interaction between
§ 102(b) and computer programs; the Ninth Circuit’s teaching that “the
structure, sequence and organization” “of computer software may be
protected by copyright where they constitute expression,” Johnson
Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175, 1177; and this Court’s interpretation of
Ninth Circuit law in Atari. Worse, it would require this Court to accept
that those two cases somehow preempted more recent Ninth Circuit
opinions recognizing that “source and object codes[] can be subject to
copyright protection,” JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125 n.3
(9th Cir. 2010), as can the “original selection and arrangement” of
computer programs without any reference to their functionality, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quotation marks omitted). These fair-use analyses cannot be stretched
that far.
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Infringement principles. Google also littered its brief with
references to the notion that protection of a particular work can be
“thin” or “weak.” E.g., GB 2, 5, 42, 70. This concept, too, is not about
the threshold question of copyrightability. Whether copyright
protection is “thin” or “broad” can be relevant to fair use (which is how
Sega used it). But it typically arises in the first instance in the
infringement analysis: i.e., whether the accused work is sufficiently
similar to the original to constitute infringement. Where protection is
broad, plaintiffs need to prove only that the accused work is
“substantially similar,” Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904,
913-14 (9th Cir. 2010), whereas if thin, plaintiffs must prove that the
accused work is “virtually identical,” Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813
(9th Cir. 2003).
Infringement concepts, like fair use, are irrelevant to the
threshold question whether Oracle’s declaring code is copyrightable.
First, such cases do not hold that computer programs are devoid of all
copyright protection. Citing Sega, Google repeatedly asserts that
generally software “receives only weak protection,” GB 2, 42, 70
(emphasis added; quotation marks omitted); see GB 2, 5, 42 (“thin”). As
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discussed in fair use (at 53-55), that is wrong. But even if that repeated
assertion were right, it amounts to a concession that the work here is
not entirely devoid of copyright protection, as the district court
erroneously concluded.
Second, cases considering the robustness of copyright protection
are irrelevant where, as here, the defendant admits that it copied. Feist
teaches that “[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be proven:
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.” 499 U.S. at 361. Focusing on
the second prong, where the “copying of constituent elements” is
admitted, the only question is whether the elements “are original”—
that is, contain protected expression. Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991
F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). “[A]
substantial similarity analysis may be useful in a copyright case when
the alleged infringer denies that he in fact copied the plaintiff’s work….
But … the substantial similarity analysis is inapposite to the copying
issue” where defendants “admit that they in fact copied phrases from”
the original work. Id. at 566.
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Because Google admits it copied, the only question is therefore
whether what Google copied was sufficiently original to be protected.
D.

Google’s Merger And Interoperability Arguments
Have No Bearing On The Copyrightability Of Oracle’s
Work.

Google’s merger and interoperability arguments are irrelevant to
the question whether Oracle’s packages are copyrightable. Both
arguments rely on the same premise: even though Oracle had limitless
choices when it authored the declaring code and structured the
packages—and the code and structure and organization of the packages
were, therefore, creative and protectable when written—the copyright
protection evaporated because of something that happened later. What
happened later was that the packages became so popular that Google
wanted to copy them to tap into the Java fan base. GB 48-51.
If this formulation of Google’s argument was not immediately
evident, it is because Google twists the meaning of ordinary words to
obfuscate their true import. Here are some translations:
“Industry standard”: Google calls the declaring code “a de facto
industry standard,” GB 10—and then subtly drops the
hedge, calling it “an industry standard,” GB 5, 55. But
Google does not mean that there is some standard-setting
organization that sets out voluntary disclosure standards
(there isn’t) or that Oracle promised to let Google or any
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other commercial enterprise use its work without a license
(it didn’t). Google just means that the software packages
became wildly popular.
“Necessary”: When Google says that everything it copied was
“necessary for compatibility,” GB 33, 46-48, it does not
actually mean “necessary.” The most Google can assert is
that “[t]hree of the [37] accused packages”—more precisely,
750 methods in 61 classes in those three packages—“were
‘fundamental to … the Java language.’” GB 19 (quoting
A140-41); see A20,946-49, 22,385-86, 20,847-49 (discussing
A5859-60). But embedded in that assertion is the concession
that it was not necessary to copy a thing from the other 34
packages—specifically, 6088 methods in 616 classes and
interfaces across all 37 packages. A1065; see A22,464.
“Interoperable” and “Compatible”: When Google says that it
copied the Java packages to ensure “interoperability with
existing programs written in” Java, GB 49, and that any use
of the Java packages “was dictated by … external factors
such as compatibility requirements,” it does not mean that it
developed a product that was in fact “interoperable” or
“compatible.” Google admits that Android is not
interoperable with Java, OB 65-66, in that “you won’t be able
to write an Android app while also using [Java]-specific
classes,” A2102. Rather, Google means that it wanted to
harness the popularity of the declaring code and
organization of certain Java packages so that Android would
have a pre-existing community of followers who were
accustomed to Java. OB 17-18.
“Imperfect interoperability”: When Google invokes the district
court’s assertion that Android achieved “a degree of
interoperability” or “imperfect interoperability,” A167,
GB 26, it does not mean that there is any significant degree
to which Android apps run on Java and vice versa. A21,50304, 22,386-87, 22,463. There isn’t. Instead, Google means
that it took the packages of code that were most valuable to
it—because programmers would expect to find them in a
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smartphone development platform, GB 18-19; McNealy Br.
25—and left behind the packages that were less useful.
With this Google-English Dictionary, this Court can begin to
understand Google’s interoperability and merger arguments. Both
arguments build upon the district court’s observation that once Google
decided to tap into the Java community by using commands that were
familiar, “there is only one way to declare a given method functionality”
and “everyone using that function must write that specific line of code
in the same way.” GB 15 (quoting A136). Both arguments rely on
Google’s idiosyncratic definition of what is “necessary”: “Google was
just trying to make Android more attractive to programmers who know
the Java API conventions,” GB 55, and once Google decided to do that,
“[t]here is no choice in how to express” a particular command, GB 15
(quoting A139). But there is no dispute that Google always had the
option of writing its own platform in the Java language without using
the bulk of the declaring code that Oracle made so popular. Which is
why Google does not deny that both arguments are no different from
Ann Droid saying, “My copying was ‘necessary’ to tap into the Harry
Potter fan base.” OB 1, 63.
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As our opening brief explained, Google’s notion that copyright
protection evaporates with popularity has never been the law.
OB 52-53, 63-65. The Copyright Act declares that a work acquires
copyright protection at the moment it is “fixed in any tangible medium
of expression,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and that “[c]opyright in a work …
subsists from its creation and[] … endures for [the copyright] term,” id.
§ 302(a); see Oman Br. 24. As the Ninth Circuit explains, “the design of
the [Copyright] Act … was clearly to protect all works of authorship
from the moment of their fixation in any tangible medium of
expression.” Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521,
524 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting CONTU Report at 21).4
This rule yields two conclusions. First, once the author creates
the work and fixes it in a tangible medium, a defendant’s subsequent

It is telling that one of Google’s main arguments for why this
should be the law for copyright is that a trademark may become a
generic term that others may use if consumer perception changes over
time. GB 50. But as the statutory quotes in the text demonstrate,
unlike trademarks, copyright protection does not turn on consumer
perception. “[I]t is to be expected that … expression in a highly
successful copyrighted work will become part of the language. That
does not mean they lose all protection in the manner of a trade name
that has become generic.” Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720
F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
4

34

Case: 13-1021

Document: 134

Page: 46

Filed: 07/03/2013

desire “to achieve total compatibility … is a commercial and competitive
objective which does not enter into the … question of whether particular
ideas and expressions have merged.” Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253
(quoted by OB 64-65 but never addressed by Google). The cases
supporting this conclusion are legion. See, e.g., Atari, 975 F.2d at 840
(“External factors did not dictate the design of [plaintiff’s] 10NES
program”); Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting,
Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2002) (expert’s “testimony” about
“interoperability … wholly misplaced” because expert “focused on
externality from the viewpoint of [defendant’s] program, not
[plaintiff’s]”); Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1375 (chastising district court for
considering “whether external factors … justified [defendant’s] copying”
because inquiry “should have remained upon the external factors that
dictated [plaintiff’s] selection” of programming); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v.
Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1347 & n.12 (1994) (rejecting
that defendant’s desire to achieve “compatibility” is relevant to
copyright), amended on other grounds, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995); see
also Oman Br. 18-23 (collecting cases).
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Second, Google’s “industry standard” argument fails, too. GB 50.
It also ignores a massive body of caselaw—including from the Ninth
Circuit—rejecting the argument that a work’s overwhelming success is
a basis for denying copyrightability. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v.
Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 517, 520 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (“PMI”) (as
amended) (physician coding system copyrightable even when
government mandated its use, making it the “industry standard”); CCC
Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73
(2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting that car values in the Red Book “[fell] into the
public domain” and lost copyright protection); Kepner-Trego, Inc. v.
Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 537 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
that “wildly successful” work was no longer copyrightable); Educ.
Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 540 (3d Cir. 1986) (“possible
domination in [a particular] field … cannot excuse copying … and
patently does not affect the validity of [plaintiff’s] copyright”).
Google proposes an alternative rule: In determining
copyrightability, “it only makes sense to look at the options available to
the alleged infringer (ex post).” GB 48. But Google does not even try to
reconcile its proposed rule with the above-quoted language from the
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Copyright Act or the overwhelming caselaw cited above and in the
opening brief (at 52-53, 63-64).5
Instead, Google, once again, cites only the fair-use discussions in
Sega and Sony, GB 48-50, and commentators (who, themselves, rely on
Sega), GB 50-51. But the answer here is the same as above: Those
passages were about fair use, not copyrightability—about whether it
was fair to use a work despite its copyright protection. So naturally
they focused on the infringer’s use rather than the original author’s
clean slate. These fair-use cases do nothing to overcome the statute and
overwhelming body of law holding that copyrightability is determined
at inception.
To the same effect is Google’s one squib from CONTU: “[W]hen
specific instructions even though previously copyrighted, are the only
and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by
another will not amount to infringement.” GB 48 (alterations omitted)
(quoting Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 (quoting CONTU Report at 20)). That
Google addresses only PMI, which it tries to minimize as applying
only to cases of “wholesale copying.” GB 49-50 n.145. But Google’s
copying was wholesale. Supra at 7, 10. Plus, PMI’s rejection of the very
same “industry standard” argument had nothing to do with the amount
of copying.
5
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passage does not say, as Google contends, that work that was
“copyrighted” loses copyright protection. Rather, it just restates the
idea/expression distinction. As the immediately preceding CONTU text
confirms: “The ‘idea-expression identity’ provides that copyrighted
language may be copied without infringing when there is but a limited
number of ways to express a given idea [i.e., merger].” CONTU Report
at 20 (emphasis added). Significantly, CONTU repeatedly emphasizes
(including in the passage quoted by Sega and Google), only the merger
doctrine bars copyright protection, and merger rarely applies because
“[t]he availability of alternative noninfringing language is the rule
rather than the exception” for computer programs. Id. at 20 n.106.
This case is the rule, not the exception. At the risk of repetition:
Google never disputes (or even addresses) that there were countless
ways for Oracle to write the declaring code and to design, structure, and
organize the packages to achieve particular functions. Supra at 7-8, 14.
Thus, merger does not apply. And years later, when Google wrote
Android, Google, too, had any number of ways to write declaring code
for the same functions, so long as it was prepared to build its own fan
base rather than hitching its wagon to Oracle’s success. OB 52;
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Spafford Br. 7-8, 12-19 (ellipse-drawing example); McNealy Br. 18-20
(time-zone example). So Google’s interoperability argument fails as
well.
E.

Oracle Preserved All Facets Of The District Court’s
Copyrightability Ruling.

As noted above (at 10-11), Google scarcely addresses the legal
conclusions that flow from its concession that it literally copied 7000
lines of original code. Google’s excuse is that these arguments are
“waived due to Oracle’s failure to object to instructions and a verdict
form that effectively eliminated that theory from the case.” GB 67.
Oracle did not waive that theory, and neither Google nor the district
court thought it did.
When Google asserts that the instruction and verdict form
“eliminated that theory,” it tacitly concedes, as it must, that the literal
copying arguments were in the case going into trial. Before trial, both
Google and Oracle identified the “declarations of the API elements in
the Android class library source code” as the code “accuse[d] of
copyright infringement.” A24,632, 24,636. But there was no need to
give the issue to the jury, because Google conceded it. While Google
quotes one part of the instruction, it leaves out the critical sentence
39
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where the court instructed the jury: “[Android] uses the same names
and declarations,” i.e., declaring code. A984-85, 22,771-73; accord
GB 18; A134. On infringement, the court wanted the jury to decide
whether Android’s structure and organization were substantially
similar to Java’s, but there was nothing for the jury to decide regarding
verbatim copying of declaring code itself.
Google understood that the literal copying remained very much in
the case when it argued, both at the close of evidence and after the
verdict, that it “[wa]s entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the
names and declarations from the 37 API packages that appear in the
Android source code are not copyrightable.” A24,644 (emphasis added);
see A974, A86-88. Google has not explained why it needed that ruling if
the theory was already waived.
The district court, too, confirmed that verbatim copying of
declaring code remained in the case. It issued its copyright order after
the verdict. The order stated: “This order addresses and resolves …
whether the elements replicated by Google from the Java system were
protectable by copyright in the first place.” A132. The “elements
replicated by Google” included “identical lines [of code] that specify the
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names, parameters and functionality of the methods and classes, lines
called ‘declarations’ or ‘headers’”— i.e., declaring code. A136 (emphasis
added). The copyright order then addressed copyrightability of the
declaring code, including the short-phrases analysis. A162-65; see
SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., 695 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (no waiver where parties “understood” specific argument had
broader applicability). Google never explains why the district court
would have gone to the trouble of deciding that issue if it had been
waived.
Accordingly, Google is wrong in arguing that “[a] reversal based
on copyrightability of the 7,000 lines viewed apart from SSO could not
alter the judgment.” GB 67. The court’s judgment of noninfringement
addressed both theories. And reversing that judgment on either theory
necessarily revives a judgment of infringement whether by jury verdict
(for structure and organization) or by judgment as a matter of law (for
verbatim copying).
F.

Google’s Policy Arguments Are Unavailing.

Google and its amici argue that copyright protection for the
declaring code is “anti-competitive” and “over-broad,” Rackspace Br. 22,
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and will be used “as a weapon to block innovation,” Start-ups Br. 12; see
GB 45; Computer Scientists Br. 2-4, 21; CCIA Br. 5. But history shows
the opposite. Since the Copyright Act expanded to protect computer
programs, software companies—including Facebook,6 Instagram,7 and
even Google8—have used copyright to protect their work. Yet the
software industry continues to thrive. BSA Br. 3-4. Still, as Google’s
amicus contends, programs that are open and available are more likely
to succeed, Rackspace Br. 8, 17-18, which provides copyright owners a
strong incentive to license reasonably—as Oracle has. OB 13-15;
McNealy Br. 21-23; Microsoft Br. 15-16.
No doubt it is faster, cheaper, easier, and more profitable for later
companies to steal an innovator’s work rather than license or create it
themselves. See Start-ups Br. 8-10, 13. But our copyright laws have
always resisted such expediency on the philosophy that “the best way to
Compare Rackspace Br. 8 with https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms ¶ 9.9 (“You will not sell, transfer, or sublicense our code,
APIs, or tools.”) (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
6

Compare Computer Scientists Br. 25-27 with http://instagram.com/
about/legal/terms/api/ ¶ 3 (“The Instagram APIs may be protected by
copyrights.”) (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
7

Compare Rackspace Br. 8 with http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/
terms.html (last accessed, June 30, 2013).
8
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advance public welfare” is to “encourage[]” authors to engage in
“individual effort by” offering them “personal gain.” Mazer, 347 U.S. at
219; accord U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106. For all their policy
expositions, Google and its amici never address, much less refute, that
Oracle would never have “invested as heavily in Java” if it knew its
“investment of millions of dollars and years of development time would
not receive copyright protection.” McNealy Br. 1; see id. at 26 (no
protection “would have deterred Sun from maintaining its decades-long
mission to revolutionize computer software development”); cf. Microsoft
Br. 3-4, 8 (district court’s opinion undermines the balance copyright law
achieves in incentivizing development and promoting innovation);
Oman Br. 2-3, 27.
Of course, Google is free to advocate for changes in copyright law,
and is doing so vigorously. See, e.g., Picture Archive Council of America
(“PACA”) Br. 12-13 (discussing Google’s anti-copyright history). But
“[n]o matter how persuasive the policy arguments … , this [C]ourt is not
the proper forum in which to debate them. Where Congress has the
clear power to enact legislation, [this Court’s] role is only to interpret
and apply that legislation … not rewrite the … laws ….” Roche Prods.
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v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded on
other grounds by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
II.

GOOGLE’S COMMERCIALLY MOTIVATED AND ILLICIT
VERBATIM COPYING IS NOT FAIR USE
Every day Google uses pilfered Oracle work to achieve ever

greater popularity and marginalize Oracle in a marketplace where
Oracle had positioned itself to be a major participant. Google suggests
(at 68-74) that another trial is necessary to determine whether it can
demonstrate fair use. No such retrial is necessary. Google’s defense
fails as a matter of law. See OB 68-77. Eager to bring its product to
market quickly, Google copied the declaring code and structure and
organization of 37 of the 166 packages in Oracle’s Java SE and then
added its own packages. In so doing, Google not only advanced its own
commercial interests but produced a platform incompatible with Java
and stole the Oracle business customers licensing Java SE in the
mobile-phone market. Fair use does not authorize copying critical
portions of a copyrighted software platform and then incorporating the
copied work into a competing platform.9

Google leads its fair-use argument with the assertion that “nine
presumably reasonable jurors reportedly found that Google had proved
9
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Despite its heavy reliance on the fair-use portions of Sega and
Sony, Google has little to say in response to Oracle’s fair-use points.
Compare OB 68-77 with GB 68-74. Below, we address what little
Google does say.
A.

Factor 1: Google’s Commercially Motivated Copying
Is Neither Transformative Nor Intermediate.

Google does not dispute that its use is commercial—to the tune of
“billions of dollars,” OB 70 (quoting A21,594)—which “tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use,” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 585 (1994); Sony, 203 F.3d at 606. But Google asserts that it
satisfies the first factor (“the purpose and character of the use”) because
its use of Oracle’s work is “transformative” and merely aimed at
achieving “interoperability.” GB 68-70. Both arguments are incorrect.
Android is not transformative. A work is “transformative”
when it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character,” thereby “altering the first [work] with new expression,
meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphases added).

that defense.” GB 68. There is nothing in the record about the jury
vote. Google tried to cite a blog posting . The blog is not in the record
and therefore not in the appendix.
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To be transformative, the new use must change the very nature of the
original, giving it “an entirely different function.” Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). As abstract
as that sounds, concrete examples demonstrate just how different the
new work must be in order to qualify as transformative.
Turning a pop song into a rap song is not transformative,
inasmuch as both have the purpose of entertaining a listening audience.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-82. Even turning it into a rap parody,
which obviously has at least some additional purpose of “commenting”
on the original, id. at 579, is not necessarily transformative, id. at
578-82. If an “infringer merely uses [the work] to get attention or to
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness
in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not
vanish).” Id. at 580 (emphasis added); see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (O.J. Simpson
satire utilizing Dr. Seuss’s A Cat in the Hat is not a fair-use parody).
Similarly, in Harper & Row (see OB 71, 74), The Nation failed the
first factor when it verbatim reproduced the juiciest tidbits of President
Ford’s memoir even though the new work was couched as news, and
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readers typically read newspapers and memoirs for different purposes.
471 U.S. at 565. Likewise, it is not transformative to turn an image in
a photograph into a sculpture, even though the two media are very
different, see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992), or to
display copyrighted paintings on a television show when used for “the
same decorative purpose” as the originals, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1997).
Android is far less transformative than any of the foregoing
illustrations. Oracle’s packages allow programmers to use prewritten
functions rather than write them from scratch. The same code in
Android (e.g., new URL().openConnection()) enables programmers to
invoke the same pre-programmed functions in exactly the same way.
Use of declaring code and packages in Android does not serve “an
entirely different function” from Java. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 818. All
Google did was use the declaring code “to get attention” from
programmers and “avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
Google argues that “Android is transformative” because “Google’s
implementation … ‘accounts for 97 percent of the lines of code in [those]
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packages.’” GB 69 (quoting A178). But Google does not dispute that a
plagiarist cannot excuse copying by showing how much of his work was
not copied. OB 42 (citing authorities). Moreover, though the
percentage of copying might be relevant to the third factor, it is
irrelevant to the first factor’s determination of whether the new work is
transformative. Thus, as discussed (OB 73)—but not addressed by
Google—The Nation failed the first factor even though the copying was
less than 1% of the original. Accord PACA Br. 17-18.
Also meritless is Google’s argument that it incorporated the
packages into “an entirely new smartphone platform.” GB 69. Oracle
already had a platform for sophisticated mobile devices. Infra at 56-58.
Google did not transform anything by updating the platform for still
more sophisticated mobile devices. Plus, a use is not transformative
where the copyist “has done no more than find a new way to exploit the
creative virtues of the original work.” Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244,
252 (2d Cir. 2006); see Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000).
Not intermediate copying under Sega and Sony. Google
argues that Sega and Sony authorize “[a] defendant’s use of copyrighted
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material to create a new platform that is compatible with existing
programs.” GB 69. That is just another formulation of the argument,
discussed above (at 31-39), that Google was justified in copying because
it wanted to (but did not have to) tap into the popularity of the software
packages.
Sega and Sony do not help Google in fair use any more than they
did for copyrightability. Those cases authorized a use that was much
more modest than Google’s. As Google acknowledges, those cases
addressed only “whether defendants could engage in ‘intermediate
copying’ of copyrighted computer programs” to “analyze” how to
“achieve compatibility with these programs.” GB 33. The copies at
issue in Sega and Sony were not final, commercial products, but
intermediate copies used to figure out how the software works. In
contrast, Google’s copying here was for a final, commercial product:
Android.
This Court’s opinion in Atari, which set the stage for those Ninth
Circuit decisions, draws this distinction explicitly. See Sega, 977 F.2d
at 1514 n.1 (Sega’s “analysis and … result” is “consistent” with Atari);
accord id. at 1524 n.7. In Atari, this Court applied fair-use principles to

49

Case: 13-1021

Document: 134

Page: 61

Filed: 07/03/2013

“new technological innovations,” and distilled the four factors to a
simple rule: “fair use reproductions of a computer program must not
exceed what is necessary to understand the unprotected elements of the
work.” 975 F.2d at 843 (emphasis added).
Sega drew the same distinction. There, Accolade’s “use of the
copyrighted material[] was simply to study the functional requirements”
needed for compatibility—i.e., “reverse engineer[ing]” to learn the
“twenty to twenty-five bytes of data” needed to make any game work on
a Sega console. 977 F.2d at 1516, 1522. Accolade “did not include any
of Sega’s code” to generate the needed data string, and wrote its own
games that included “a total of 500,000 to 1,500,000 bytes.” Id. at
1515-16. Contrary to Google’s repeated insinuations that Sony and
Sega condone “use” of copied code (GB 33, 35, 39), the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the result would have been different if Accolade had
done what Google (or Atari) did: “Our conclusion does not, of course,
insulate Accolade from a claim of copyright infringement with respect to
its finished products.” Id. at 1528 (emphases added); accord id. at 1515.
The same was true in Sony. Sony emphasizes repeatedly that “none of
the Sony copyrighted material was copied into, or appeared in,
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[defendant’s] final product,” 203 F.3d at 600; accord id. at 598-99, 602,
606-07, 608 n.11.
This Court has confirmed that “Sega … does not stand for the
proposition that any form of copyright infringement is privileged as long
as it is done as part of an effort to explore the operation of a product
that uses the copyrighted software.” DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse
Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (1999). The DSC defendant
created a telephone-exchange card that had to download and copy the
software of the plaintiff’s exchange system to function. Id. at 1358. In
words equally apt here, this Court held that use of the plaintiff’s
software was not fair because it was not “part of an attempt at reverse
engineering” but rather “part of the ordinary operation of those cards”
for business. Id. at 1363.
Even if Sega and Sony could be stretched to encompass copying
that is neither intermediate nor restrained, Google’s entire focus on
“interoperability” is misplaced. Here again, Google cannot invoke
interoperability as an excuse for copying when it intentionally produced
a platform that was not interoperable in the relevant sense of the word.
Supra at 32-33. Google’s expert and the district court agreed that
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interoperability means a program that “runs on both the Android
platform and the Java platform.” A22,348; see A167 (programs that
“run” on each platform); Spafford Br. 20. Nevertheless, Google contends
Android achieved “a degree of interoperability with existing Java
programs” that use only the 37 copied packages. GB 26, 55, 72 (quoting
A167). But that is just wrong. Google and its Technical Program
Manager for Android Compatibility concede that Android is not “Java
compatible” and does not support “existing Java apps.” OB 66. Google’s
expert admitted that, because “[t]he entry points [in the code] are
different on the platforms,” any Android or Java “program itself would
need to be modified … so that it would run on the [the other] platform.”
A22,386-87. “[Y]ou don’t really have compatibility,” Oracle’s expert
explained, A21,503-04, since the Android and Java codes have different
bytecode architecture, A22,463, and different file formats, compare Trial
Exhibit (“TX”) 610.210 (Java “.jar” files) with A24,657-59 (Android “.apk”
files).11

10

Submitted in native-file form in Supplemental Joint Appendix.

Google’s observation (at 52-53) that the Sony defendant
implemented some, but not all, of Sony’s functions is misplaced. The
11
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Factor 2: Oracle’s Packages Are Highly Creative.

As to the “nature of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), the
conversation begins and ends with Google’s decision not to contest
Oracle’s extensive presentation that the work is “original, creative,
intuitive, attractive,” and so forth. GB 5 (quoting OB; internal
quotation marks omitted); see OB 72; McNealy Br. 10-21. Instead of
challenging that undeniable reality, Google’s analysis revolves around
this: “As Sega recognized, computer programs are ‘essentially
utilitarian’ in nature, and, under the Copyright Act, ‘if a work is largely
functional, it receives only weak protection.’” GB 70 (quoting Sega, 977
F.2d at 1527). Sega never said that all computer programs receive
weak protection. It said: “To the extent that there are many possible
ways of accomplishing a given task or fulfilling a particular market
demand, the [developer’s] choice of program structure and design may
be highly creative and idiosyncratic.” 977 F.2d at 1524 (emphasis
added). The passage Google selectively quotes says merely that certain
elements of some computer programs can be dictated by “logical,

Ninth Circuit did not even bother mentioning the fact, because the
games in Sony “run” on each system and were thus interoperable.
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structural, and visual display elements,” and thus receive only weak
protection. Id. at 1524. Google fails to demonstrate any such restraints
on the original Java developers. See OB 12-13, 32-33, 39-40, 51-52.
Google does not respond to other Ninth Circuit authority
discussed in our opening brief (at 73) finding software to be sufficiently
creative to warrant broad copyright protection, where, as here, it is
creative, intuitive, and attractive. Nor does Google grapple with Atari,
where this Court reasoned that the software was necessarily “creative”
and “original,” thus “protectable,” because there were “a multitude of
expressions” available. 975 F.2d at 840.
C.

Factor 3: Google Copied The Most Important Parts Of
The Packages.

On this factor, Google emphasizes, again, that it copied “a small
fraction of the overall code.” GB 71. But the third factor is not just
about the “amount” but also about the “substantiality of the portion
used.” See PACA Br. 21-23. Google does not respond to Harper & Row,
which is dispositive. The copying there, though only 1% of the total,
was unfair because the “quoted excerpts” were the work’s “dramatic
focal points” and played a “key role in the infringing work.” 471 U.S. at
566; see OB 74. Applying this principle, Google does not dispute that it
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copied the declaring code of the packages it thought programmers would
want in a smartphone platform. GB 18-19; A21,956-58, 21,152-53,
21,503; McNealy Br. 25 (Google “copied Java’s packages that were most
useful for mobile platforms”). Nor does Google dispute that declaring
code is all-important, because that is the only code programmers ever
see or use. OB 20-21, 43-44, 74.
Here, again, Google latches onto the district court’s reasoning that
“Google replicated what was necessary to achieve a degree of
interoperability—but no more.” GB 71. But this argument depends on
the same flawed logic as to what was “necessary.” Supra at 32. Since
the undisputed fact is that Google did not need to copy the vast majority
of the declaring code to write programs in the Java language, id., the
copying was not necessary in any relevant sense of the word. It was
merely desirable to achieve a commercial objective. That makes it
unfair.
D.

Factor 4: Android Hurt The Market And Potential
Market For Derivative Works Of Java SE.

Android caused significant “harm to the market” and “potential
market” “for derivative works” of Java SE. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 568; 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). Google completely ignores the “harm to the
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potential market” that would ensue from infringement such as
Android’s “becom[ing] widespread,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568
(citation omitted), and barely addresses the actual market harm
Android caused.
Perhaps the starkest illustration of harm was Oracle’s market for
licensing of Java ME for mobile devices and of its dedicated smartphone
platform. Market harm does not get any more concrete than the
illustration in our opening brief, to which Google never responds:
Amazon licensed Java ME and its platform for its electronic reader,
Kindle. OB 28-29, 77. But, when Amazon selected the platform for its
new e-reader, the Kindle Fire, it abandoned Java in favor of the (free)
Android platform.
Google concedes that, before Android, Oracle “dominated” the
mobile platform market, GB 17, through licensing of a Java SE
derivative, Java ME, see OB 15; A20,708. But Google insists that does
not matter because Java ME was for “feature phones” while Android is
for “smartphones.” GB 72 (citation omitted). Google does not dispute,
however, that Oracle licensed Java ME to “just about every smart
phone carrier … around the world,” A22,237, including smartphones
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such as RIM’s BlackBerrys, Danger’s Sidekicks, and Nokia’s Series 60s,
OB 71. To differentiate some smartphones from others (as Google does)
slices the “market” too thin. The “market for derivative works” here is
the market for mobile device platforms, not the market for platforms
that support a specific generation of phones. See Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“extraordinar[ily] detail[ed]” reports of TV episodes were “adequate
substitute[s]” and undermined market for the shows).
Google only underscores the profound impact it had on Oracle’s
market by quoting the district court’s observation (albeit not from any
fair-use analysis) that “Oracle never successfully developed its own
smartphone platform.” GB 72 (quoting A135). “When Google made
Android available for free, Oracle was effectively competing with a free
version of its own program.” McNealy Br. 7. The business case for
Oracle selling a dedicated smartphone platform (Java FX) evaporated,
A20,490—another classic example of a superseding use. OB 76-77;
A6142 (“Google is both a potentially key adopter of Java FX due to their
strong support of Java on non-Android devices … but they are also a
potentially dangerous competitor.”).
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Android also harmed the potential market for a Java smartphone
device. Sun/Oracle contemplated creating a Java smartphone—
separate from the Java FX platform. A20,490-95; see GB 21 (citing
A20,487). Building a Java smartphone was one reason Oracle
purchased Sun. A8248, 20,487-90. Oracle even built a prototype and
devised a strategy to charge carriers for the phone rather than
advertising (like Google does). A20,490, 20,495-96. Thus, there can be
no doubt that smartphones represented a “potential market” for the
Java platform. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).
Against all this, Google argues that Android is not a derivative of
Java. GB 72-73. That is beside the point. Factor four considers harm
to derivatives (i.e., harm to Oracle’s Java SE derivatives), which has
nothing to do with whether the infringing work (Android) is itself a
derivative. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
Google also responds with Sega (at 73), but there the copying
likely helped the market prospects of the original author: Accolade’s
copying “led to an increase in the number of independently designed
video game programs offered for use with the [Sega] console.” 977 F.2d
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at 1523 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Sega suffered only “minor
economic loss,” id. at 1524, and the court found “no basis” for concluding
that Accolade’s copying “significantly affected the market” for Sega’s
work, id. at 1523. Here, by contrast, no Android program can run on
any Java platform, and Oracle has no possible upside in the unlicensed
copying of its work.
E.

Any Remand Must Be Limited To Fair Use Only.

Google argues in one sentence that if there is a remand on fair
use, this Court must also order a new trial on infringement. GB 73-74.
Google’s argument improperly relies on incorporation-by-reference of
briefs it filed below. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2006). Moreover, Google admits that it copied the declaring
code and the structure and organization of the packages. It is not
entitled to a trial on an issue that it conceded and on which it offers no
legitimate defense.
Even if Google had a triable issue, it is not entitled to a retrial of
an issue it already tried and lost. The question whether Google’s
copying of Oracle’s code constitutes infringement is “distinct and
separable” from whether Google can establish fair use. Gasoline Prods.
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Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931). The two issues
are not “interwoven,” and it would not create any “confusion and
uncertainty” to submit fair use to the jury without allowing that jury to
decide infringement as well. Id.
CROSS APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Google admits it copied portions of Oracle’s code verbatim into the
Android platform and that the portions of code are copyrightable. Is
Google’s copying copyright infringement?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Java platform includes eight files that contain security
functions governing access to network files. A21,501-02. Google
decompiled those files and then copied them identically, “in their
entirety,” into Android. A989, 1058A-B; accord A21,431-32, 21,919.
Google “agrees that the accused lines of code” (i.e., the eight files)—
containing hundreds of lines of code—“came from [Oracle’s] copyrighted
material.” A989; accord A1058A-B, 3552-69, 21,431-32, 21,875-76.
The Java platform also includes nine lines of original source code
from “java.util.arrays.java,” called “rangeCheck.” A21,426-27.
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“rangeCheck” facilitates an important sorting function, frequently
called upon during the operation of Java and Android. A2877-937,
20,923, 21,501, 21,427, 21,436.
As the parties agreed and the jury was instructed, A989, Android
includes the identical nine lines of code in the files “Timsort.java” and
“ComparableTimSort.java.” A21,426-27, 5980; compare A2877-937 with
A1819-37. Android mobile devices call the rangeCheck code 2,600 times
just while powering on. A21,501. After start-up, many other files
continue to call upon rangeCheck. A21,488.
At trial, Google conceded direct copying of both rangeCheck and
the security files. Google did not claim “fair use,” A42, instead raising
as a defense “only” that its copying “[wa]s de minimis.” A989.
The jury was instructed: “With respect to … rangeCheck and
other similar files [i.e., security files], Google agrees that the accused
lines of code and comments came from the copyrighted material but
contends that the amounts involved were so negligible as to be de
minimis and thus should be excused.” A989 (emphasis added).
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As to rangeCheck, the jury rejected Google’s de minimis defense
and found infringement. A42. The court denied Google’s JMOL. A124,
129.
As to the security files, the jury returned a noninfringement
verdict. A42. But, because the testimony showed that Google’s “us[e of]
the copied files … would have been significant,” and “[t]here was no
testimony to the contrary,” the court concluded that “[n]o reasonable
jury could find that this copying was de minimis” and granted Oracle’s
JMOL. A1058A-B.
The district court entered final judgment for Oracle as to the
security files and the rangeCheck code. Google appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Google’s efforts to hide behind a so-called “de minimis” exception
to copyright protection fails. Where defendants concede verbatim
copying, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize any de minimis defense.
Instead, the amount of the copying is evaluated under fair use. Even
assuming a de minimis defense, Oracle’s rangeCheck and security files
are significant. The judgments of infringement should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO “DE MINIMIS” DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT.
As a threshold matter, the district court’s judgment can be

affirmed on the ground that the Copyright Act prohibits copying subject
only to the limitations of §§ 107-22. Accordingly, “even a small taking
may sometimes be actionable.” Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d
563, 566 (9th Cir. 1993).
Google argues that its copying of rangeCheck and the security
files is not infringement because the copying was “de minimis.”
GB 76-79. The district court properly concluded that the copying here
was not de minimis. § II. Also, as Oracle urged below, § 102 does not
include any de minimis exception. See A24,626 (contending “[n]o de
minimis exception can, as a matter of law, defeat Oracle’s claim based
on this copying”); accord A24,602A.12
Though Google contends the amount of verbatim copying must be
“significant enough to constitute infringement,” GB 76 (quotation marks
While Oracle did not argue this throughout the proceedings below,
this Court can affirm “on any ground that finds support in the record.”
Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281 (1957); Rexnord Indus., LLC v.
Kappos, 705 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Livid Holdings Ltd. v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2005).
12
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omitted), the only provision contemplating consideration of “the
amount” of copying is the third fair-use factor. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)
(“amount and substantiality of the portion” copied).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit does not recognize a freestanding
de minimis defense. Norse, 991 F.2d 566. In Norse, defendants
published a poet’s biography containing verbatim copies of phrases from
plaintiff’s unpublished letters to the poet. The copied phrases appeared
in a single paragraph of the 768-page biography. The Ninth Circuit
held that the case could not be dismissed on de minimis grounds: “The
question of whether a copying is substantial enough to be actionable
may be best resolved through the fair use doctrine, which permits
courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to
foster.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). See 2 Nimmer & Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright, § 8.01[G], at 8-26 (the “de minimis … defense
should be limited largely to its role in determining either substantial
similarity or fair use”).
Google invokes Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir.
2004), involving music sampling. GB 76-77. But, as an earlier decided
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panel decision whose holding is directly on point, Norse is binding here.
Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2003) (“one three-judge
panel of this court [generally] cannot reconsider or overrule the decision
of a prior panel” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, subsequent sampling
cases in the Ninth Circuit have not followed Newton, see, e.g., Swirsky v.
Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing sampling claim under
rubric of sufficient original expression), and Newton has been rejected
elsewhere, see, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d
792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005) (expressly rejecting “mental gymnastics” of de
minimis defense).
As the Ninth Circuit’s disregard of Newton confirms, Newton was
wrongly decided. In Newton, the defendant copied a three-note
sequence from a recording without a license to the composition. The
issue was whether the average audience could discern the plaintiff’s
“hand as a composer … from [the defendants’] use of the sample.” 388
F.3d at 1196. Failing to cite Norse and relying instead on out-of-circuit
authority interpreting the predecessor 1909 Copyright Act (not the
operative 1976 Copyright Act), Newton held that defendants’ use of the
three-note composition was de minimis—seemingly carving out a de
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minimis exception from “the general test for substantial similarity.” Id.
at 1193-95. This was error. “‘Substantial similarity’ is not an element
of a claim of copyright-infringement. Rather, it is a doctrine that helps
courts adjudicate whether copying … actually occurred ….” Range
Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2012). It has no relevance to cases where, as here, verbatim
copying is conceded. Id.; Norse, 991 F.2d at 566; see Nimmer, supra,
§ 8.01[G], at 8-26.
In light of the Ninth Circuit’s binding authority in Norse, Google’s
reliance on Second Circuit precedent is misguided. GB 77 (citing
Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74).
Because Google concedes it copied the rangeCheck code and the
security files, A989, and because Google’s “only” defense to
infringement—de minimis—is not a cognizable defense, A989, this
Court should affirm the judgments of infringement.
II.

GOOGLE’S COPYING WAS SIGNIFICANT.
Even if there is a de minimis defense, the jury reasonably found

Google’s copying more than de minimis as to rangeCheck and the
district court correctly held that the defense would fail as a matter of
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law as to the security files. Google concedes that copying is not de
minimis if the copied work is “qualitatively or quantitatively
significant.” GB 77 (emphasis added). The unrefuted record establishes
that the security files and rangeCheck had substantial significance—
both to Oracle and to Google. Thus, the jury was correct to find
infringement of rangeCheck, A42, and the district court was correct to
hold that no reasonable juror could find anything but infringement of
the security files, A1058A-B.
As to rangeCheck, Dr. Mitchell presented unrebutted testimony
that it is significant and called upon often by other files. In one
experiment testing the importance of rangeCheck, Dr. Mitchell
observed that it is called upon at least 2600 times just when an Android
device is powering on. A21,501. This is not disputed.
As to the security files, Google contends that the “files [a]re
qualitatively [in]significant to the [Java] platform.” GB 77. But that is
not what the undisputed testimony was: Dr. Mitchell testified that
these files are significant because they are “the default implementation
for the security functions” that “govern access to a network or other
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resource” in the Java platform. A21,501-02. Google offered no evidence
in response.
Google also argues the security files are not “qualitatively
significant to … Android” because “they were used to test the [Android]
platform” but not shipped on any Android devices. GB 77. But
companies invest significant time and money developing code to test
products to ensure that they reach the market without quality issues.
A21,502-03. Such testing “is a very important part of the software
development.” A21,502. Indeed, “by many measures the testing and
quality assurance process can be twice as time consuming or twice as
expensive as coding originally.” Id. In short, code used for testing can
be as valuable as that used in the end product.
Google suggests that a minimum number of lines of code must be
copied before finding infringement. GB 78-79. “[N]o bright line rule
exists as to what quantum of similarity is permitted.” Baxter v. MCA,
Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987); Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v.
A10 Networks, Inc., C 10-3428-PSG, 2013 WL 831528, *8 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 10, 2013) (copying 145 lines of code out of 10 million not de
minimis); CyberMedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
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1077 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (copying not de minimis even where the code
copied comprised a relatively small percentage of the program).
Because no particular quantum of lines of code needs to be copied
for infringement, and because the qualitative value of the copied code is
so substantial, Google cannot show that the district court erred.
III. THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE “WORK AS WHOLE”
WAS NOT ERRONEOUS OR REVERSIBLE.
Google argues that the jury instruction incorrectly defined “the
work as a whole” with regard to rangeCheck and the security files.
GB 75-76. As an initial matter, this Court need not even reach this
issue if it agrees with either of the arguments presented above. An
instruction regarding quantitative analysis for proving de minimis
copying is inconsequential if there is no such defense. The argument
also does not matter if Oracle proved as a matter of law that the copied
code was qualititatively significant.
In any event, the district court correctly held, on the facts of this
case, that the individual code files copied were the work for the purpose
of evaluating Google’s culpability for direct copying of these files.
Google’s two-paragraph argument does not show otherwise. The Ninth
Circuit holds that “an entire work” can be a subset of a larger work if
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that work “can stand totally alone.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (1986) (cited by GB 75 n.193).
“[W]hen a single published unit contains multiple elements ‘that are
otherwise recognizable as self-contained works,’ the unit is considered a
single work for the limited purpose of registration, while its elements
may be recognized as separate works for other purposes.” A33 (quoting
37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i)(A)); accord Super Future Equities v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 553 F. Supp. 2d 680, 699-700 (N.D. Texas 2008) (finding
whole work was the website page, not entire website).
Google does not show the trial court erred in determining that the
copied code files were stand-alone works. These files, which are not
within the 166 packages, can and do stand alone as individual units in
source- and object-code form. See A2877-964. Indeed, the files are the
tangible medium in which the copied expression is fixed and from which
Google actually copied, and accordingly were admitted into evidence as
individual files, each with its own copyright notice and author
information. Id. Under those circumstances, the copying was
quantitatively significant since, as the district court found, Google
copied the eight security files “in their entirety.” A1058A-B. And
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Google failed to ever rebut any of the evidence of the files’ function and
significance. Supra at 67-69.
CONCLUSION
On Oracle’s appeal, this Court should reverse the district court’s
judgment and enter judgment on liability for Oracle. On Google’s crossappeal, this Court should affirm the district court’s judgment.
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